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Abstract  50	  
Children demonstrate a pervasive in-group bias, preferring their in-group across a range of contexts 51	  
that encompass measures of liking, imitation, and, in some cases, resource allocation. A growing 52	  
number of studies have begun to explore whether antisocial in-group behavior reduces the robustness 53	  
of this bias. However, these studies have focused on transgression evaluations, with only two studies 54	  
focusing on social learning and none explicitly on imitation. This, therefore, limits the extent to which 55	  
children’s responses to interaction between in-group bias and antisocial behavior can be fully 56	  
understood. The current research expands on the prevailing literature, utilising imitation as a 57	  
behavioral measure to explore the reactions of children aged 4-5 and 7-8 years in response to 58	  
antisocial in-group behavior. Consistent with previous literature, antisocial in-group behavior reduced 59	  
in-group liking ratings. Surprisingly, however, children’s behavioral imitation preferences were 60	  
guided solely by group membership, disregarding prosocial or antisocial behavior. These results 61	  
indicate children’s explicitly reported social preferences and imitative preferences may be motivated 62	  
by two independent drives.  63	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Children’s imitation of antisocial in-group members  73	  
The human tendency for imitation is unmatched by any other species (Horner & Whiten, 74	  
2005) and is frequently cited as a central component to our success (Boyd & Richerson, 1996; 75	  
Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Imitation 76	  
underpins children’s acquisition of object-related skills, critical in human environments that comprise 77	  
multiple tools and artifacts lacking ready perceptual information about their functional significance 78	  
and modes of operation. This cognitive opacity makes it challenging for novices to identify which 79	  
actions or behaviors are appropriate for each artefact they encounter and which are not (Gergeley & 80	  
Csibra, 2006). Directly and comprehensively copying others thus affords the rapid acquisition of a 81	  
vast array of essential skills that have been developed and accumulated through multiple past 82	  
generations (Nielsen, 2012). Copying others is also a mechanism of social affiliation and can be 83	  
employed as a means of demonstrating to potential, or actual, in-group members that you are like 84	  
them and/or want to be liked by them (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013; Kinzler, 85	  
Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012). As such, this tendency to imitate 86	  
is a critical building block of our human-ness.  87	  
The motivation and capacity for imitation emerges early; from 6-months-of-age infants show 88	  
an ability for copying others’ object-directed actions (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Meltzoff, 1988). 89	  
Moreover, there is evidence that this proclivity for imitation becomes increasingly socially motivated 90	  
from the pre-school years on (Flynn & Smith, 2012; Marsh, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2014; Nielsen, 2006; 91	  
Uzgiris, 1981). For example, from 14 months, children prefer to learn from an in-group member over 92	  
an out-group member, even when the actions are nonsensical (Buttelmann et al., 2013). By three years 93	  
of age, children show a preference to imitate an individual who speaks their native language rather 94	  
than a foreign language speaker (Howard, Henderson, Carrazza, & Woodward, 2015). From four 95	  
years of age children prioritise learning from a native compared to a foreign accented English-96	  
speaker, even when both demonstrators speak nonsensical words (Kinzler et al., 2011). This 97	  
preference is so robust children will contrast their behavior to that of out-group members 98	  
(Oostenbroek & Over, 2015). Complementing these social learning proclivities is the phenomenon of 99	  
overimitation: the tendency to copy others with such high fidelity that even visibly, causally irrelevant 100	  
actions get incorporated and replicated (e.g., Kenward, 2012; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; 101	  
McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Overimitation has been 102	  
documented	  across contrasting cultural groups (Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014, 2016; 103	  
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) – although see Berl & Hewlett (2015) – and been shown to persist even 104	  
when children are explicitly instructed not to copy redundant actions (Lyons et al., 2007). Children 105	  
from a young age decide what to copy, from who, under what circumstances, and these decisions 106	  
strongly guided by social motivations (Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Marsh et al., 2014). 107	  
Prosocial behavior – which includes sharing, donating resources, cooperative, comforting 108	  
others and volunteering to help without self-benefit (Killen & Smetana, 2015) –  is also salient to 109	  
young children. Children prefer prosocial to antisocial agents (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010), 110	  
will actively intervene in situations that they perceive as unjust (Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011), 111	  
even when they incur personal cost to do so (McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015; Riedl, Jensen, 112	  
Call, & Tomasello, 2015). These behavioral effects are also shown to have correlated neural effects 113	  
(Decety & Cowell, 2017). Importantly, morally-laden violations appear to be distinguishable from 114	  
violations of convention. Indeed, extensive research has shown that social norms – behavioural 115	  
uniformities that structure social interactions within social systems – are considered less serious and 116	  
generalizable than moral norms – acts that have intrinsic consequences for others’ rights or welfare 117	  
(Smetana, 1981; Smetana, Schlagman, & Walsh Adams, 1993). In line with this, children appear to 118	  
apply social norms more robustly to in-group members, while moral norms are more broadly 119	  
applicable (Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2012). Additionally, children 120	  
use different types of protest for moral vs. social norms, with one study identifying the use of explicit 121	  
protest for social norms and implicit protest for moral norms (Josephs, Kushnir, Gräfenhain, & 122	  
Rakoczy, 2015).  123	  
To date, despite extensive documentation of in-group bias and prosocial preferences, only a 124	  
handful of studies have examined how these two biases may interact, showing that with age, children 125	  
increasingly consider prosociality when making social decisions (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas, 126	  
Rizzo, Cooley, & Killen, 2016; Hetherington, Hendrickson, & Koenig, 2014; Killen, Rutland, 127	  
Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013; Mulvey, Hitti, Rutland, Abrams, & Killen, 2014; Schug, Shusterman, 128	  
Barth, & Patalano, 2013). Moreover, two studies have explored this in a social learning context. One 129	  
study has revealed that while liking was primarily guided by prosociality, selective trust in 130	  
information providers was guided by group membership (Hetherington et al., 2014). Another study 131	  
has revealed that children will conform to a group consensus on a social learning task, but will eschew 132	  
group decisions that involve immoral actions (i.e. social exclusion) (Guerrero, Elenbaas, & Enesco, 133	  
2017). However, no study thus far has employed actual imitative behaviour to measure social learning 134	  
preferences. As previously noted, imitation is consistently shown to be socially motivated 135	  
(Buttelmann et al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2012; R. Watson-Jones, 136	  
Whitehouse, & Legare, 2015). As such, choices around who to imitate are inherently social choices. 137	  
Considering children’s strong tendencies to avoid antisocial agents, we would anticipate that 138	  
antisocial behavior is likely to reduce imitation fidelity. The aim underpinning the current study was 139	  
to bridge this gap in the literature, examining who children elect to copy in an imitation task when 140	  
presented with prosocial out-group and antisocial in-group models. 141	  
In line with past research (Hetherington et al., 2014) we hypothesised that children who are 142	  
exposed to antisocial in-group behavior will show a reduction in liking ratings, as well as a reduction 143	  
in imitation levels compared to those who are exposed to prosocial in-group behavior. Both imitation 144	  
fidelity and the tendency to consider others’ perspectives when making socio-moral judgements have 145	  
been shown to increase with age (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas et al., 2016; Kenward, Karlsson, 146	  
& Persson, 2011; Killen, Lynn Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Lyons, Damrosch, 147	  
Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, Moore, & Mohamedally, 2012). As such, 148	  
we predicted that older children would imitate more faithfully than younger children, but would also 149	  
weigh antisocial behaviour more heavily than younger children. We, therefore, predicted higher rates 150	  
of imitation in older when both groups were prosocial, but lower rates of imitation and lower liking 151	  
ratings when their in-group behaved antisocially. We did not predict differences in liking ratings 152	  
across age groups when both groups were prosocial.  153	  
Method 154	  
Participants 155	  
A total of 84 children participated in the experiment. Two were excluded due to experimenter 156	  
error, leaving a final sample of 82 children. These children comprised an older (7-8 years, N = 43, M 157	  
= 91.84 months, SD = 8.22 months, 22 male, 21 female) and younger (4-5 years, N = 39, M = 60.82 158	  
months, SD = 8.7 months, 20 male, 19 female) group. These ages were selected as children show 159	  
developmental jumps across this period in both their adherence to prosocial norms (Smith, Blake, & 160	  
Harris, 2013) and their tendency to consider the perspectives of others when making socio-moral 161	  
judgments (Cooley & Killen, 2015; Elenbaas et al., 2016; Killen et al., 2011). As such, we anticipate 162	  
that any developmental changes emerging from the interplay between in-group preference and 163	  
concern about antisocial behaviour would likely emerge across this period. Data collection occured in 164	  
Australia. Primary collection occurred at a science museum in a metropolitan city (51 children), in 165	  
dedicated testing labs at a large university (17 children), and within local child care centres (14 166	  
children). Children from the University were predominantly Caucasian and from middle class 167	  
socioeconomic backgrounds. Due to the nature of data collection at the science museum and within 168	  
the local child care centres, demographics were not collected. However, unpublished past research has 169	  
indicated that families participating at the science museum are from high to middle class 170	  
socioeconomic backgrounds. Children were randomly assigned to an experimental or control 171	  
condition.  172	  
Procedure 173	  
To begin the experiment, children were asked to randomly select a colored token from a small 174	  
drawstring bag. They were told that there was a red token and a yellow token available, and 175	  
whichever color they removed would determine their group. This process was pre-determined, such 176	  
that there was only one color available to each child, however children were not aware of this during 177	  
the group allocation process.  178	  
After allocation children were presented with a wrist band and bandana of their assigned 179	  
color. They were then provided with a short spiel about the study, adapted from previous research 180	  
(Oostenbroek & Over, 2015): “You’re in the red group because you picked the red coin, but there is 181	  
also a yellow group. The red group and the yellow group are on different teams. In every competition 182	  
the red group wants to beat the yellow group and the yellow group wants to beat the red group. The 183	  
red group works together as a team to beat the yellow group and the yellow group works together as 184	  
a team to beat the red group”. Children were then narratively checked for comprehension. If children 185	  
were unable to correctly answer which group they were in, the information was re-presented to them. 186	  
No child took more than two attempts to answer correctly.  187	  
Following group allocation, children were asked to answer how much they liked the in-group 188	  
(their color) and the out-group (other color). This question was presented on a child-friendly 1-5 189	  
Likert type scale with smiling to sad faces. Scale comprehension was checked narratively for this 190	  
question and the scale was re-presented if necessary. 191	  
Children were then exposed to videos of in-group and out-group members performing 192	  
prosocial and antisocial behaviors, and subsequently, videos of one member of each group 193	  
demonstrating how to perform a separate imitation task. The prosocial and antisocial behaviors 194	  
consisted of either sharing or not sharing a bar of chocolate, or knocking down or building up a third 195	  
person’s tower (group non-affiliated) (Appendix 1). Each video depicted three group members 196	  
individually performing the actions consecutively, wearing colored t-shirts to convey their group 197	  
membership. We used three group members, rather than an individual to highlight that the prosocial 198	  
or antisocial behaviour of the group was endorsed by the entire group, rather than just the behaviour 199	  
of a single potentially rogue group member. All actors were Caucasian adult females. The content of 200	  
behavior varied by condition: in the control condition both groups behaved prosocially, while in the 201	  
experimental condition the in-group behaved antisocially while the out-group behaved prosocially. 202	  
After viewing each set of videos (one video each of the in-group and out-group), children 203	  
were shown a second pair of videos in which one member of each group performed an imitation task 204	  
in two different ways (again, one video of each the in-group and out-group). The imitation tasks were 205	  
a necklace task (threading beads onto a necklace) and a box task (opening a puzzle box) (Figure 1). 206	  
Both methods involved causal and non-causal actions, were equally efficient and lead to the same 207	  
non-rewarded outcome, and both consisted of three imitative and six overimitative actions (Appendix 208	  
2). Presentation order of both prosocial and antisocial behaviour videos, and imitation videos were 209	  
counterbalanced to account for group membership.  210	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Figure 1. Apparatus for the necklace and box imitation tasks.  226	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After seeing the four videos (two prosocial/antisocial and two task), children were told that it 243	  
was their turn to have a go at the task and the apparatus from the video was placed in front of them. If 244	  
children queried what to do, they were told they could do whatever they wanted. Children were then 245	  
given 60 seconds to act on the apparatus. Once they had completed the first imitation task (or 60s had 246	  
expired), children viewed the second prosocial/antisocial videos and the subsequent matched task, 247	  
before being offered the opportunity to participate in the task themselves. The chocolate sharing video 248	  
was always paired with the box task and the tower video was always paired with the necklace task. 249	  
The presentation order of the video pairs was randomized. Upon completion of all tasks children were 250	  
again asked to rate how much they liked each group on a 1-5 Likert type scale. Upon completion of 251	  
the experiment, parents and children were debriefed, and children were offered a small prize.  252	  
Scoring  253	  
Initially, responses were coded for imitative and overimitative actions where children were 254	  
given a score of 1 for each causally relevant (removing the dowels and opening the door, placing the 255	  
beads on the string) and causally irrelevant (running a hand along the dowels, tapping the beads to 256	  
their head) action they reproduced for both in-group modelled actions and out-group modelled 257	  
actions. On each task, imitation scores could range from 0 – 3, while overimitation scores could range 258	  
from 0 – 6. However, preliminary analyses revealed no differences between the patterns of results for 259	  
either measure. Therefore, for the sake of parsimony, we present combined imitative and 260	  
overimitative scores in the analyses so that each child received one in-group imitation and one out-261	  
group imitation score for each task.  262	  
Reliability 263	  
  A second coder, blind to the study and hypotheses, was presented with data from twenty 264	  
randomly selected participants (25% of trials). According to intraclass correlation coefficients, inter-265	  
rater reliability was high for all dependent variables: necklace task in-group imitation = .82, p < .001; 266	  
necklace task out-group imitation = .76, p = .002; box task in-group imitation = .81 p < .001, and box 267	  
task out-group imitation = .80, p = .001.  268	  
Results  269	  
Preliminary analyses  270	  
Primary analyses revealed no effect of sex or testing location on any of the dependent 271	  
variables, and thus these factors are not considered further. Initial paired samples t-tests revealed that 272	  
overall imitation was higher for the box task than the necklace task for both in-group (M = 5.12 vs 273	  
4.41) t(81) = 2.08, p = .041, d = 0.22, and out-group imitation scores (M = 1.60 vs .79), t(81) = 2.37, p 274	  
= .020, d = -0.31. Therefore, results are presented separately for each task. However, it is important to 275	  
note that in-group imitation on each task showed a significant moderate to high correlation (r = .527, 276	  
p < .001), demonstrating that the tendency to imitate the in-group was strong across tasks, with 277	  
differences relating to relative numbers. No correlation was found for out-group imitation (r = .172, p 278	  
= .122) 279	  
Imitation (in-group vs. out-group) 280	  
Box task. A paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference in imitation rates for in-281	  
group vs. out-group imitation, revealing that children copied their in-group (M = 5.12) significantly 282	  
more than the out-group (M = 1.60) across conditions, t(82) = 6.13, p < .001, d = 1.11. A two way 283	  
MANOVA was conducted to identify any effects of condition or age on in-group and out-group 284	  
imitation scores. Results revealed a significant main effect of age for in-group imitation F (1, 78) = 285	  
4.55, p = .036, ηp2 = .06, where older children (M = 5.88) imitated at a significantly higher rate than 286	  
younger children (M = 4.28). There was no significant main effect of condition, nor a significant age x 287	  
condition interaction for in-group imitation (ps > .289). Moreover, there was no effect of any 288	  
variables on out-group imitation rates (ps > .093).  289	  
Necklace task. A paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference in imitation rates for 290	  
in-group vs. out-group imitation, revealing that children copied their in-group (M = 4.41) significantly 291	  
more than the out-group (M = .79) across conditions, t(82) = 8.74, p < .001, d = 1.57. A two way 292	  
MANOVA was conducted to identify any effects of condition or age on in-group and out-group 293	  
imitation scores. Results revealed a significant main effect of age for in-group imitation F (1, 74) = 294	  
4.71, p = .033, ηp2 = .06, where older children (M = 5.07) imitated at a significantly higher rate than 295	  
younger children (M = 3.70). However, there was no significant main effect of condition, nor a 296	  
significant age x condition interaction on in-group imitation (ps > .591). Moreover, there was no 297	  
effect of any variables on out-group imitation rates (ps > .082).  298	  
Liking ratings (pre-post stimulus)  299	  
In-group liking ratings. A three-way mixed design ANOVA including age (older vs. 300	  
younger), condition (both groups prosocial vs. in-group antisocial) and time (pre vs. post stimulus 301	  
exposure) examined children’s in-group liking ratings. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 302	  
employed, but the full degrees of freedom are reported. A time x condition interaction was found, F 303	  
(1, 78) = 16.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. Follow up simple two-way interactions revealed no significant 304	  
differences in condition at pre-measure, F (1, 80) = .914, p = .342, ηp2 = .11, such that children in the 305	  
In-group Antisocial condition (M = 4.64) reported liking their group the same as those who were in 306	  
the Both Groups Prosocial condition (M = 4.49). However, at post measure there was a significant 307	  
effect of condition, F (1, 80) = 16.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, such that children who saw their in-group 308	  
behave prosocially (M = 4.60) liked their group significantly more than children who saw their group 309	  
behave antisocially (M = 3.53).  310	  
Out-group liking ratings. A second three-way mixed design ANOVA including age (older 311	  
vs. younger), condition (both groups prosocial vs. in-group antisocial) and time (pre vs. post stimulus 312	  
exposure) examined children’s in-group liking ratings. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 313	  
employed, but the full degrees of freedom are reported. Results revealed a time x condition 314	  
interaction, F (1, 78) = 6.57, p = .012, ηp2 = .08. Follow up simple two-way interactions revealed no 315	  
significant differences in condition at pre-measure, F (1, 80) = .672, p = .431, ηp2 = .01, such that 316	  
children in the In-group Antisocial condition (M = 2.74) reported liking the out-group the same as 317	  
those who were in the Both Groups Prosocial condition (M = 3.00). However, at post measure, there 318	  
was a significant effect of condition, F (1, 80) = 4.25, p = .042, ηp2 = .05, such that children who saw 319	  
their in-group behave antisocially (M = 3.85) liked their out-group significantly more than those who 320	  
saw both groups behave prosocially (M = 3.19).  321	  
Discussion 322	  
This study is the first to examine the effects of in-group antisocial behavior on young 323	  
children’s imitation preferences. We exposed children to in-group and out-group members engaging 324	  
in prosocial and antisocial behaviors, and subsequently demonstrating two different, but equally 325	  
efficient ways, to perform a task. Although the children showed a reduction in how much they liked 326	  
in-group members when they behaved antisocially, this did not persuade them to choose to imitate the 327	  
out-group model – rather, across conditions children persisted with copying the in-group. Previous 328	  
literature has shown that group membership is a salient social guide for children’s learning: children 329	  
prefer to learn from in-groups over out-groups in a range of contexts (Buttelmann et al., 2013; 330	  
Howard et al., 2015; Kinzler et al., 2011). Moreover, Hetherington and colleagues (2014) have shown 331	  
that children prioritise group membership over antisocial behavior when deciding who to learn novel 332	  
information from. This research extends previous studies to provide the first evidence of group 333	  
membership guiding social learning preferences in an imitation task, over and above antisocial 334	  
behavior.  335	  
Given that children’s imitation persisted at such a high rate, despite reduction in liking 336	  
ratings, these results are unlikely to be due to a lack of concern about, or identification of, antisocial 337	  
behavior. Instead, children’s imitative preferences must be guided by something other than general 338	  
affective processes (but see McAuliffe & Dunham, 2016). It is possible that social learning is guided 339	  
by perceptions of competence, while liking is guided by kindness. However, given that both methods 340	  
demonstrated in the imitation task were equally efficient, it is unlikely that this could explain the 341	  
results of the current study. Alternatively, it is possible that children did not perceive ethical quandary 342	  
in copying the amoral actions demonstrated. Notably, it was essential to use tasks free from moral 343	  
valence in this experiment, as it allowed us to distinguish children’s desire (or reluctance) to imitate 344	  
an antisocial in-group generally, as opposed to their desire to imitate antisocial in-group actions. The 345	  
former provides greater insight into the role of antisocial behavior and a potential inhibitor to social 346	  
affiliation. As such, children may not have been concerned with potential harm from imitating amoral 347	  
actions, seeing them as distinct from the antisocial behaviours demonstrated. In support of this Cooley 348	  
& Killen (2015) found that children would deviate from an in-group member who supported a norm 349	  
of unequal sharing, but not from one who supported a norm of equal sharing. Future research should 350	  
investigate the bounds of imitation preferences specifically – for example, will children imitate in-351	  
group behavior if the imitative behavior itself causes harm? Past research has shown that imitation is 352	  
lower in scenarios where harm is caused by the action, yet it does not dissipate entirely (Keupp, 353	  
Bancken, Schillmöller, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2016). Given children’s sensitivity to the intention behind 354	  
harmful actions (Vaish et al., 2010), it is pertinent to understand whether intentionally harmful actions 355	  
would reduce children’s willingness to imitate their in-group.  356	  
There are two methodological factors that must also be considered. It is possible that 357	  
children’s judgement of the group in general is underpinned by different mechanisms that the choice 358	  
to imitate an individual member of said group. Unfortunately, the current methodology does not allow 359	  
us to answer this question. Future research should explore the variability in results from imitating 360	  
antisocial individuals vs. antisocial groups to determine if there are different mechanisms at play. 361	  
Alternatively, it could be that the two DVs included in this study differ in sensitivity i.e. the liking 362	  
measure is more sensitive than the imitation measure. This could explain why we identified changes 363	  
in liking and not in imitation. However, considering the similar patterns identified in past research 364	  
(Hetherington et al., 2014) we argue that these differences are likely reflective of a genuine difference 365	  
in motivation, even if there are also differences in the sensitivity of measures.  366	  
Finally, we must also consider the context of the imitation tasks. While the tasks used in this 367	  
experiment included causally opaque actions and no explicit rewards, the tasks themselves were of a 368	  
practical nature – that is, they were not characterised by start-end-state equivalency, which is argued 369	  
to signal ritual behavior (Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014). Research has shown 370	  
that children prioritise different learning models for practical vs. ritual type actions, being more 371	  
willing to forego task success for group affiliation in ritual tasks compared to practical tasks (Wilks, 372	  
Kapitány, & Nielsen, 2016). Therefore, tasks characterised by ritual actions could lead children to 373	  
focus more on the affililative and/or normative component of imitation, which may lead to differing 374	  
priorities when deciding who to imitate. Interestingly, in the current study, seven children chose to 375	  
avoid the antisocial in-group action and only imitated the out-group action on one task (though, no 376	  
child did so on both tasks). While occurring at a very low rate (4.27% of tasks), this indicates that 377	  
some children potentially have the capacity and drive to eschew antisocial in-group behavior in an 378	  
imitative context.  379	  
When examining the motivation behind imitation, and particularly overimitation, the 380	  
literature often refers to the importance of social drive (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 381	  
2012; Uzgiris, 1981). The results of the current study shed new light on the complexity of this drive, 382	  
showing children as young as four years can reduce how much they like their in-group in response to 383	  
antisocial behavior, while simultaneously engaging in socially affiliative behaviors towards that 384	  
group. Considering this, we must acknowledge that social affiliation goes beyond simple affective 385	  
processing. Instead it could be argued that affiliation is motivated by fear of social repercussions; 386	  
straying from the in-group method risks social exclusion. In line with this, children will overimitate at 387	  
higher rates if they have previously been ostracised from a group (Watson-Jones, Whitehouse, & 388	  
Legare, 2015). Alternatively, the present results may be motivated by prescriptive norms; children 389	  
engaged in the behavior they felt they were required to do as an in-group member. These two 390	  
motivators may not be independent, and further research is needed to tease them apart.  391	  
Overall, the results presented here speak to the necessity humans have for intergroup bonding 392	  
– even in the face of discovering negative things about an in-group, children remain inclined to align 393	  
themselves with, and preference learning from, members of that group. Moreover, the in-group 394	  
members in the current study were not physically present - merely shown on video. Given this, one 395	  
would expect social pressure to be diminished. The strong effects that persist here further highlight 396	  
the significance of our need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) . The nature of large-scale social 397	  
groups that characterises our species determines that social interactions will be complex and, more 398	  
specifically, contextually variable. This study provides evidence that children, from a young age, hone 399	  
the skills required to be successful in these multifaceted interactions.  400	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